The John Batchelor Show

DC's Decline and the Search for a New Imperial Capital. Gaius and Germanicus debate where the new capital of the American Empire should be located, noting that Washington, D.C., is losing its usefulness. This parallels the Roman abandonment of Rome when it became indefensible and the imperial economy shifted east, leading Constantine to establish Constantinople. DC is troubled by a bypassed population and a shrinking federal workforce, partly due to the consolidation of AI data centers in Virginia. A shift in the capital would symbolize a dramatic transformation of American identity. Germanicus suggests Miami as a potential new capital because it already serves as the entrepôt for Latin America, fitting a potential "America First" hemispheric identity. This focus aligns with the large Hispanic influx and the migration of Northerners into strong Southern states like Florida and Texas. Just as DC was originally situated midway between the North and South colonies, the new capital must be centered where North and South meet to cement a new identity. The hosts anticipate a future hemispheric alliance where America becomes a fortress and a startup for a billion people in the 22nd century. 1712 CAESAR Retry

The Oligarchic Motives Behind the "No Kings" Protest. Gaius and Germanicus, speaking from Londinium, discuss the contemporary "No Kings" protest occurring across the American Empire, noting the young people involved are protesting the outcome and subsequent actions taken following the 2024 democratic vote. While Gaius sees the protest as amateurish, Germanicus finds it rooted in deep ignorance. Germanicus emphasizes that kingship is profoundly alien to both the Roman experience (which was founded on the overthrow of kings) and the American experience, pointing out that even a Roman emperor would never call himself a king. The true American Revolution was a rebellion against Parliament, not King George III. The element that is truly sinister, however, is not the youthful protestors but the oligarchy that created the enterprise. This elite class, which feels entitled to rule and controls the ruling institutions, is threatened by the rise of "big men" (like Crassus or Pompey) supported by populism. The "No Kings" metaphor is an absurd and ahistorical tactic used by the threatened oligarchy to quash this popular movement. The hosts then turn to debating the necessity of moving the American Empire's capital, as DC's usefulness is outworn. 1582 OTHO

LONDINIUM 91 AD. Carthage, Gaza, and the Risk of Unhealable Imperial Wounds. Gaius and Germanicus open by reviewing recent international news, including a major ceasefire signing hosted by Mr. Trump and proposals for US-Russia talks in Budapest, moderated by Mr. Orbán. The conversation pivots to the analogy between the Roman destruction and subsequent revival of Carthage and the modern conflict in Gaza. Despite being destroyed in 146 BCE, Carthage became prosperous and essential to the Western Roman Empire's bread basket centuries later. Gaza, however, is a "wholly symbolic artifact of contention." Germanicus observes that Israel's dependence on the US to preserve its vision, which currently requires the emptying and incorporation of Gaza, tests the West's moral standards regarding the conduct of war. The hosts discuss whether reconciliation can occur over historical time. However, if Israel forces an expulsion of the people of Gaza—mirroring what the Romans did to Israel—the resulting transgression will be so great that the wound will become "codified in the very identity of the people who were wronged" and never heal. This unforgiven wrong risks the long-term disappearance of the US and Israel, much like how the memory of the Roman presence in North Africa was "expunged and wiped away." 1569 LONDINIUM

8. The West's 2014 Appeasement: The Failure to Respond to Crimean Annexation. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) focuses on the annexation of Crimea in 2014 via "brute force" and the Western response. Professor Plokhy suggests that if NATO's reaction to Crimea had been commensurate with its response to the 2022 invasion, the current large-scale war might have been avoided. Instead, the West treated the annexation as an exception, comparing it to the 1930s Anschluss of Austria, believing Putin would cease aggression after securing the Russian-majority region. This thinking was a mistake; for example, Germany continued pursuing Nord Stream 2, based on the failed premise that economic ties guaranteed peace. NATO's overall policy was designed to pacify Russia and avoid placing military units near its borders, resulting in NATO having "very little to respond with" when the annexation occurred. Russia quickly moved beyond Crimea, concocting uprisings in Donbas, leading to a massive Russian counterattack against Ukrainian forces in the summer of 2014. This led to the Minsk II agreements, which NATO backed. However, Russia exploited Minsk II by insisting on holding elections first under its military control—a plan intended to insert a "Trojan horse" into Ukraine's political body to destabilize it and block its Euro-Atlantic integration. This resembled the policies of appeasement seen in the 1930s. 1855 BRITISH ARMY CRIMEA

7. Bucharest 2008 and the Failed Bid to Prevent Russian Aggression. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) discusses how Vladimir Putin's powerful presidency, rooted in a manipulated super-presidential constitution, enabled him to assert the right to dictate which countries could align with the West. The April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest was a critical turning point. Though the US, led by George W. Bush, favored inviting Ukraine and Georgia to join the alliance, Western allies, notably Germany, opposed the idea, leading to a split. The outcome—a promise of future membership with no specifics—was the "worst outcome possible." Putin used this weakness, starting a war in Georgia months later, effectively annexing territory and disqualifying Georgia from joining NATO due to territorial conflicts. This demonstrated that Ukraine and Georgia had exposed themselves to future Russian attacks by publicly seeking NATO membership without securing "meaningful Western support," meaning military aid. Domestically, Putin viewed the 2004 Orange Revolution, which rejected his preferred candidate Viktor Yanukovych, as a threat to his own power structure. Yanukovych later returned and, in 2013, was bribed and pressured by Russia not to sign an EU association agreement, sparking the Euromaidan Revolution which served as a stepping stone toward the 2014 Crimean annexation.

6. The Dictatorial Power of Putin and the Unification of Ukraine Post-2014. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) focuses on the unilateral nature of decision-making in the Kremlin regarding the 2014 invasion. The decision to annex Crimea and fragment Ukraine was made by Vladimir Putin and his security chiefs during an all-night meeting on February 23–24, 2014. This process confirmed that Russia operates as a dictatorship, transitioning from the hope of Russian democracy under Yeltsin to the current reality where Putin's power is rooted in the super-presidential constitution established in 1993. Putin initially gained public support through brutality in Chechnya. While Ukraine was traditionally viewed as split between Eastern and Western orientations, Russia actively exploited these linguistic, cultural, and religious divisions in 2014 to justify the takeover of Crimea and the initiation of hybrid warfare in Donbas. Crucially, the professor emphasizes that the shock of the 2014 conflict had the opposite effect desired by Moscow: it unified Ukrainian society far more than it had ever been before. Moscow's biggest error in planning the 2022 invasion was proceeding under the assumption that Ukraine was still the divided country it had been in 2014.

5. Western Appeasement of 2014: Crimea Annexation and the Flawed Minsk Accords. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) examines the Western reaction to the annexation of Crimea in February 2014, following the appearance of "little green men." Professor Plokhy asserts that had the West reacted to the Crimean annexation with the same severity as they did to the 2022 invasion, the major war might have been avoided. Instead, the collective West treated Crimea as an isolated exception, drawing a historical parallel to the 1930s Anschluss of Austria, and mistakenly believed that Putin would stop there. This flawed assumption led Germany to pursue economic ties like Nord Stream 2, hoping escalation would be less likely. Moreover, NATO's policy was to pacify Russia by not placing military units close to its borders, leaving the alliance with "very little to respond with" in 2014. Although the annexation was quickly followed by Russian-concocted violence in Donbas, leading to a massive Russian counterattack in summer 2014, the West pursued the Minsk II agreements. These agreements were often implemented according to Russia's interpretation: requiring elections first under Russian military control, intended to create a "Trojan horse" to destabilize Ukraine and preclude its movement toward the EU or NATO. This approach was closely related to the "policies of appeasement of the 1930s." 1840 KHIV

4. The 2014 Kremlin Decision and Ukrainian Unity Against Russian Imperialism. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) discusses the all-night Kremlin meeting on February 23–24, 2014, where Vladimir Putin and his state security chiefs unilaterally decided to annex Crimea and fragment Ukraine. This scene exemplifies modern Russia's nature as a dictatorship, where critical decisions are made by one man—Putin, a former FSB chekist—without democratic oversight. Putin's dictatorial powers are legally based on the super-presidential constitution approved in 1993, following Boris Yeltsin's actions against the parliament. Previously, Putin built credibility by being brutal during the conquest of Chechnya in 1999. A longstanding stereotype divided Ukraine between westward (often Roman Catholic/cosmopolitan) and eastward (Orthodox/Russian-speaking) orientations. While Russia exploited these existing linguistic, cultural, and religious tensions in 2014 to facilitate the seizure of Crimea and initiate hybrid warfare in Donbas, the ultimate effect of the 2014 aggression was the creation of a much more unified Ukrainian society than had ever existed before. Moscow's failure to recognize this post-2014 change was a fundamental miscalculation when invading in 2022.

3. US Intelligence Successes vs. Policy Failures Leading to the 2022 Invasion. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) details the period leading to the February 2022 invasion, where Russia positioned troops along the border, while the Biden administration publicly ruled out sending US troops or weapons to Ukraine. This policy is identified as a "colossal misjudgment" of Putin. Although US intelligence successfully reported Kremlin war plans almost in real time, hoping to deter Putin, little was done to militarily strengthen Ukraine. The prevailing Western assessment—that Kyiv would fall quickly and Ukraine would be overrun within a week—was based on a massive miscalculation that underestimated the Ukrainian military and people's resolve. Vladimir Putin framed the war using historical claims, stating that Russians and Ukrainians are "one people." This belief, rooted in 19th-century Russian imperial ideas, led to the flawed expectation that 150,000 to 200,000 troops would be sufficient and that Ukrainians would welcome them. Putin's central aim, consistent since the 2014 war, remains stopping Ukraine's Western drift and forcing it into the Russian-controlled Eurasian Union. The countdown to the current war began after President Zelensky, who was an unlikely war leader elected in 2019, refused to implement the Minsk agreements according to Putin's destabilizing agenda during their meeting in Paris in December 2019.

2. The Colossal Misjudgment: Underestimating Ukraine and Putin's Imperial Ambitions. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) covers the lead-up to the 2022 full-scale invasion, noting Russia's military buildup in 2021 while President Biden publicly stated that no US troops or weapons would be sent to Ukraine, which constituted a "colossal misjudgment of Putin." Despite the lack of meaningful preparatory military aid for Ukraine, US intelligence performed exceptionally well, accurately predicting the timing of the war and releasing this intelligence in real time, hoping to "shame" Putin. The expectation that Kyiv would fall within days reflected a profound misjudgment: underestimating the resolve of the Ukrainian state and people, and overestimating the Russian military's capacity. To justify his actions, Putin built an argument to the Russian people based on a "misreading of history," reviving 19th-century Russian imperial ideas that claimed Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians constituted a single whole. This false belief led to the expectation that Ukrainians would welcome Russian troops with flowers, rather than weapons. Putin's consistent goal since 2014 was to stop Ukraine's Western trajectory and integrate it into the Russian-controlled Eurasian Union. When President Zelensky refused Putin's demands regarding the implementation of the Minsk agreements in Paris in December 2019, many observers mark this moment as the countdown to the 2022 invasion.

1. The Roots of the Russo-Ukrainian War: Putin's Power and the Failure of the 2008 NATO Summit. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) analyzes the origins of the Russo-Ukrainian War, highlighting Vladimir Putin's authority, which is derived from Russia's super-presidential constitution. This power allowed him to move toward dictating who could align with the West. The 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest proved critical: the alliance split, with the US favoring membership for Ukraine and Georgia, and Germany leading opposition. This resulted in a failure to agree, leaving Ukraine and Georgia exposed to future Russian attacks without military guarantees. Putin responded by starting the war in Georgia later that year, effectively annexing territory and rendering Georgia ineligible for NATO. In Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, backed by Putin, lost the 2004 election due to the Orange Revolution, which Putin viewed as a serious threat to his authority in Russia. Yanukovych returned in 2010 and, pressured by Russia, refused to sign an association agreement with the European Union in 2013, triggering the Euromaidan Revolution. This protest against Moscow's influence was a direct prelude to the annexation of Crimea and the start of the 2014 war. 1855 TATARS CRIMEA

8. The Misreading of Russia: Ideology and the Insufficiency of Alliances The debate over whether Ukraine should join the EU or NATO fundamentally misses the core issue: Russia's unwavering ideological belief that it must dominate and control Ukraine. If Russians are driven by this revanchist, neo-imperialist ideology, they will continue to seek control regardless of Ukraine's alliances, potentially through misinformation or political interference. American administrations (including Obama, Trump, and Biden) and many Western European powers have consistently misread Russia, treating it as rational or transactional, and thus failed to take its ideological goals seriously. This lack of understanding about Russia's commitment to control Ukraine means that any proposed "settlement" that does not acknowledge Ukraine as an independent state is doomed. Countries like the Baltics and Poland, which have hands-on experience dealing with Russia, correctly recognized the persistent threat but were often dismissed as overly dramatic.1855 CRIMEA Retry

7. The Brutality of Control: From Stalin's Cynicism to Putin's War The cruelty demonstrated by Russian forces stems from a historical Russian/Soviet brutality where human life is regarded as cheap. Stalin exemplified this cynicism, as shown in a 1932 letter where he discussed using severe force to prevent losing control of Ukraine. For Moscow, controlling Ukraine is crucial, and both Imperial and Putin's governments are willing to use extreme violence to subjugate the population. When Putin launched the 2022 invasion, he was isolated and surrounded by yes-men, trapped by his belief that Ukrainians were essentially Russians who would welcome Russian control. The military force deployed was inadequate for conventional warfare, suggesting they planned only a short "policing operation"—a quick raid to change the government and hold a parade. This miscalculation and the resulting brutality are driven not by immediate security concerns like NATO, but by the deep psychological belief that Ukraine is not a real state and must be controlled by Russia. 1855 BRITISH ARMY

6. Volodymyr Zelenskyy: The Evolution of Ukrainian National Identity Volodymyr Zelenskyy, born in 1978, represents a modern, non-ethnic definition of Ukrainian identity. Zelenskyy is a Jewish, native Russian-speaking former comedian and successful media entrepreneur who spent a substantial part of his career in Moscow. His identity showcases that being Ukrainian is now primarily a national affiliation based on commitment to the state, transcending language or ethnic background. Zelenskyy entered politics as an outsider because the old guard had failed to bring prosperity or resolve the war in Donbas and the Crimea crisis. Russian propaganda attempts to label him as a neo-Nazi, but his background contradicts this. He initially believed that his native Russian language and past work in Moscow would enable him to successfully negotiate a peace treaty or resolution with Vladimir Putin.

5. Putin's 2021 Essay and the Road to Annexation: Myths Versus Reality Isolated during the COVID-19 pandemic, Vladimir Putin read history and published an essay in 2021 that was revelatory of his expansionist, revisionist thinking. This document, based on historical myths, asserts that Ukrainians are essentially Russians, that Ukraine has always been Russia, and that its future must be fully subordinated to Moscow. Experts often misjudged Putin, seeing him as utterly cynical and rational, failing to recognize his ideological commitment to turning these myths into reality. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a reaction to the Euromaidan uprising, which deposed the pro-Russian president Yanukovych. Putin saw Ukraine's pivot to the West as an immediate threat, necessitating the seizure of Crimea and the Donbas industrial areas before it was "too late." In Donbas, initial local protests were quickly bolstered by Russian infiltrators, mercenaries, and funding, escalating the situation into a mix of local dissent and invasion.

4. Khrushchev, Putin's Perceptions, and the Soviet Golden Age in Ukraine The Soviet period saw Ukraine rise to crucial importance; leaders like Khrushchev and Brezhnev spent large parts of their careers in the Ukrainian Communist Party apparatus. In 1954, Khrushchev transferred Crimea from the Russian Federation to Ukraine for practical reasons, as Kyiv was better positioned to manage it than Moscow. During the 1960s, Ukraine became a critical industrial manufacturing center, producing coal, military ballistic missiles, and space-related equipment, reinforcing its centrality to the Soviet state. Vladimir Putin, born in 1953, formed his understanding of Ukraine during this relatively calm period. For his generation, it was implicit and taken for granted that Ukraine was merely an extension of Russia—a source of industry, grain, and the beloved vacation spot of Crimea, the "Soviet Florida." Russians became emotionally attached to Ukraine as "ours," making the idea of Ukrainian independence not even a question for debate in the Russian mindset. 1855 CRIMEA

3. Post-Revolution Collapse, Failed Statehood, and the Holodomor Following the collapse of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires after World War I, Ukrainians sought independence. The Ukrainian People's Republic emerged from the Russian collapse as a democratic state with liberal policies. However, it quickly collapsed internally, as its bureaucrats were heavily Russified, and externally, as various Russian armies (communist, monarchist, or liberal) immediately invaded, united by the belief that Ukraine must be part of Russia. Separately, the West Ukrainian People's Republic was defeated and incorporated into Poland. Later, Stalin, fearing internal Ukrainian dissent and needing grain exports for military modernization, implemented forced collectivization. This led to the purposeful famine of the Holodomor (1932-1933), resulting in deaths of an estimated 3.5 to 5 million people. This tragedy served Stalin's goal of breaking the backbone of the Ukrainian peasantry to secure the region before World War II devastated the landscape.

2. Galicia, World War I, and the Finkel Family's Soviet Incorporation This segment explores Western Ukraine (Galicia), distinct from the Russian Empire until relatively late. While Russia used forced assimilation and violence against Ukrainians, Galicia under the Austro-Hungarian Empire practiced tolerance, allowing Ukrainian language and nationalism to flourish. St. Petersburg deeply feared this, viewing the small region as a "Ukrainian Piedmont" that could spread nationalistic ideas and eventually unite Ukraine against Russian control. This anxiety—the desire to seize and Russify Galicia—was a key, often overlooked reason for Russia's entry into World War I. Russia occupied Galicia briefly but failed to keep it; however, in 1939, following the division of Poland by Stalin and Hitler, Western Ukraine was finally incorporated into the Soviet Union. The professor's grandfather, Israel/Lev Finkel, fought bravely for the USSR in the Great Patriotic War despite his Galician background, demonstrating the complex loyalties resulting from shifting imperial projects.

1. Khmelnytsky and the Russian Imperial Project The discussion begins with the 1888 statue of Bohdan Khmelnytsky in Kyiv, symbolizing the 200-year quest to dominate Ukraine. Khmelnytsky, a 17th-century Orthodox nobleman, led a rebellion against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to protect the Orthodox Church and create a proto-Ukrainian state. Unable to win against Poland, he swore allegiance to the Tsar of Moscow, leading Russians to celebrate him as the unifier of Ukraine and Russia. Khmelnytsky intended a military alliance, but the Tsars viewed it as Ukraine fully joining Russia, gradually dismantling Cossack freedoms. By 1783, coinciding with the US Peace of Paris, Catherine the Great formalized Russia's imperial project, expanding to the Black Sea and integrating Crimea. Russia treated Ukraine as a colonial project, calling it "New Russia" and inviting diverse European settlers, seeking to force these people to become Russian, which Ukrainians resisted, forming the core of ongoing conflict. 1859 ODESSA

Cockatoos Wreak Havoc: Avian Vandals Attack Roofing Bolts Jeremy Zakis The discussion focuses on the intense destructive power of cockatoos in New South Wales, described as "gang members" who work in packs. Jeremy Zakis reports that eight to ten cockatoos had been actively targeting his neighbor's steel roof, successfully wrenching out two-inch-long galvanized steel roofing bolts. Jeremy notes the creatures are incredibly strong, with beaks capable of damaging the steel. In a particularly surprising act of "villainy," one cockatoo flew a removed bolt across the property line and dropped it onto Jeremy's driveway. The hosts speculate that this act could be a deliberate warning that Jeremy's house is next. These birds are clearly the disruptive outliers in the local happy bird world. DARWIN'S FUNERAL